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Sell unipolarity? The future of an
overvalued concept
JEFFREY W. LEGRO

For at least the past thirty years, scholarship on international relations
has been bewitched by a simple proposition: the polarity of the international system is a central cause of great power strategies and politics. 1
The number of "poles" (dominant countries) in the system is like an
invisible fence that shapes states as if they were dogs with electronic
collars or a Skinner box that conditions national "rats." States can
choose to ignore the fence or box, but if they do, they must pay the
consequences. The polarity of the international system as defined by
the number of great powers - involving more than two (multipolarity), two (bipolarity), or one (unipolarity) - is expected to mold states
and international politics in different predictable ways. The central
place of polarity in IR theory is such that it is commonly assumed that
the appropriate way to study the world is to examine the impact of
polarity first and then move on to other lesser factors to mop up any
unexplained variance. 2

1

2

For comments and helpful suggestions, I am grateful to Kyle Lascurettes,
William Wohlforth, and participants at a CIPPS seminar at McGill University.
The decisive point was the release of the masterpiece on polarity and the
importance of systemic theorizing: Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International
Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). There have of course been
many other studies on polarity - some before Waltz and many after. See, for
example, Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New
York: Wiley, 1957); Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power
Systems and International Stability," World Politics 16, 3 (1964): 390-406;
Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International
Organization 39, 4 (Autumn 1985): 579-614; Randall Schweller, "Tripolarity
and the Second World War," International Studies Quarterly 37, 1 (March
1993): 73-103; Edward Mansfield, "Concentration, Polarity, and the
Distribution of Power," International Studies Quarterly 37, 1 (March 1993):
105-128; Ted Hopf, "Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War,"
American Political Science Review 85, 2 (June 1991), 475-493.
This is the flavor of Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W.
Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New
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Such a view, however, is problematic. What seems increasingly clear
is that the role of polarity has been overstated or misunderstood or
both. This is the unavoidable conclusion that emerges from the penetrating chapters in this volume that probe America's current dominant
status (unipolarity) with the question "does the distribution of capabilities matter for patterns of international politics?" 3 Despite the explicit
claim that "unipolarity does have a profound impact on international
politics" 4 what is surprising is how ambiguous and relatively limited
that influence is across the chapters.
The causal impact of unipolarity has been overvalued for three fundamental reasons. The first is that the effects of unipolarity are often
not measured relative to theinfluence of other causes that explain the
same outcome. When the weight of other factors is considered, polarity seems to pale in comparison. Second, rather than being a structure that molds states, polarity often seems to be the product of state
choice. Polarity may be more outcome than cause. Finally, while international structure does exist, it is constituted as much by ideational
content as by material capabilities. Again polarity loses ground in
significance.
The import is clear: sell polarity. Just like a bubbled asset, polarity
attracted excessive enthusiasm in the market of IR concepts. It was
not always like that. When Waltz wrote his seminal Theory of International Politics (1979), scholars were not paying enough attention to
the way capabilities define international structure. But like the idea or
hate it, polarity has held court over systemic theory discussions ever
since. To be sure, there was a lag in polarity studies after the end
of the Cold War as experts attempted to come to grips with the shift
from bipolarity to uni polarity. Moreover there was a wave of literature
that was explicitly non-material and typically addressed the distribution of power as a defective alternative explanation, not a conjoint

3
4

York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) that features the primacy of external
factors yet allows internal causes to "intervene." Individual contributions in
this volume vary in this tendency. Classic realist monographs that feature
systemic-level logic include Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major Power War
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000); and John J. Mearsheimer, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). Waltz, Theory of
International Politics, strongly cautions against reductionism.
John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohlforth, Chapter 1, this
volume, p. 3.
Ibid., p. 4.
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cause. 5 Now, however, a number of insightful books have been written specifically on uni polarity. 6 There is in addition a broader literature
that leans heavily on the importance of US primacy or its absence.7
What the essays in this volume suggest is that polarity retains importance (don't sell all unipolarity assets), but not as the kingmaker of causation (do reduce portfolio exposure). Instead the effects of polarity
are often only apparent in conjunction with other factors. If we are to
understand both great power strategies and international structure we
need better conjunctural theories that explicitly model how different
types of causes interact to produce outcomes. The chapters here offer
a start on that effort. This chapter builds on that start by exploring
one particular conjunction: how international politics is defined, not
just by the structure of power, but also by the dominant ideas within
nations and across the international society of nations. The point is
not that either power or ideas is key but instead that the interaction
and conjoint influence of power and ideas best explains outcomes.
5

6

7

Some of this literature is reviewed in Ian Hurd, "Constructivism," in Duncan
Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit, eds., Oxford Handbook of International
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and
State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999); G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of
Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); T. V. Paul, James Wirtz,
and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st
Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004 ); Robert Jervis,
American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005);
Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," International Security
31 (Winter 2006): 7-41; special issue on Unipolarity, World Politics 61, 1
(January 2009); William Zartman, ed., Imbalance of Power: U.S. Hegemony
and International Order (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008); and Stephen G.
Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International
Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002); Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power:
The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005);
Robert J. Lieber, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Charles Kupchan, The End of
the American Era (New York: Knopf, 2002); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The
Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004); Jervis, American
Foreign Policy in a New Era; and Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath:
How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Public Affairs, 2005).
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What follows has two related parts. First I consider the chapters
above to illustrate both the utility and limits of polarity in explaining international politics, especially in this unipolar age. Second, the
chapter considers the way that ideas and polarity in conjunction shape
international politics - both in terms of state purpose and the nature
of international politics.

Polarity as a cause
Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlfarth usefully define polarity in
terms of material capabilities ("military, economic, technological, and
geographic" 8 ) not influence. This distinction is necessary to examine
whether the distribution of capabilities where one, two, or three or
more great powers stand out from other countries (and hence are
poles) actually converts into some sort of influence on international
politics.
This conceptualization leaves out at least one dimension of capabilities that Waltz includes: organizational-institutional "competence." 9
That factor, however, looks very close to the influence that we would
want to investigate as following from raw power and thus threatens
tautology. This is especially true because it is not material in the sense
that the others are and it defies a priori measurement. Largely a reflection of strategy and decision making, competence looks dangerously
close to counting stupidity and cleverness as "material." John Ikenberry's chapter illustrates there is utility in separating organizational
strategy and capabilities - both can influence the nature of the system.
In the hands of accomplished scholars, polarity has been an esteemed
concept in international relations since at least World War Two. 10
Walt's 1979 opus set the modern-day gold standard: it had tremendous
influence promoting the concept of international structure defined by
the distribution of capabilities, specifically the number of dominant
powers or "poles." In recent years, scholars have paid special attention
to the importance of unipolarity. For example, Brooks and Wohlforth's
recent book is a tour de force on how the systemic constraints on the
8
9

10

Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlfarth, Chapter 1, this volume.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 113. Waltz also includes size of
population as a determinant of polarity.
See fn. 1 above.
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United States in contemporary world politics have been overstated in
the international relations literature.11
The essays in this volume, however, imply there are declining returns
to a single-minded focus on polarity. Polarity faces three significant
problems that put in question its elite status as a cause of international
politics: it is ambiguous in its impact, endogenous to (rather than
a fount of) the purposes of states, and incomplete as the source of
systemic structure.

Ambiguous
Some of the most wide-ranging examinations of the effects of uni polarity are found in this volume. They purposefully explore, not a specific
outcome in international politics, but instead, a range of potential
effects of unipolarity. They look for influence on the (1) unipole (its
goals, provision of public goods, control over outcomes, domestic politics), (2) actions of other states (balancing, alliances, use of institutions), and (3) nature of the international system (the level of conflict,
the durability of the power distribution). They find that unipolarity
does indeed matter for international politics.
This is a noteworthy finding but has to be taken in context. Given
that international relations is determined by many factors, any exercise that limits its focus to the impact of a single variable is going to
find some effect. In light of the importance of polarity in the IR literature over the past thirty years, it should not be a shock to find that
unipolarity matters in influencing some of these things.
What is more debatable is whether polarity has a "profound impact
on international politics." 12 This claim demands some sort of test of the
magnitude of the impact of polarity relative to alternative explanations
for the same outcomes. As Jervis notes, "structure influences but does
not determine patterns of behavior." 13 But how much does it influence?
In statistical terms we would want to know what accounts most for
the observed variation in the dependent variable. In causal terms we
would want to know which theorized mechanisms more accurately
capture reality. These are tasks that clearly cannot be taken up in the
11

12

13

See Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance and the review articles on
their book in Review of International Studies (forthcoming).
Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth, Chapter 1, this volume, p. 4.
Robert Jervis, Chapter 8, this volume, p. 256.
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limited space of their chapters, so the authors do not engage in any
explicit assessment of the effects of polarity relative to other factors.
But what is surprising is that to the extent they do, factors other than
polarity appear more consequential in shaping the different outcomes.
For Wohlfarth, status concerns that pervade international politics
are heightened or ameliorated depending on polarity. Different types
of polarity unleash different levels of status competition that cause different levels of conflict. Unipolarity reduces status competition because
the hierarchy of power is so clear, thus explaining the absence of great
power military conflict and competition since 1991. Wohlfarth emphasizes the way that relative capabilities shape status. By definition, however, the nature of status competition is, at least partly, exogenous to
power (or we would not have to talk about status, but instead just
power), so factors other than polarity may account for any reduced
competition today. For example, status competition can depend on
cultural understandings - as it did in ancient China - not just power.
Wohlforth's analysis indicates polarity and status together shape great
power behavior. Less clear is whether they have affected the likelihood of war. Status competition should have varied in the move from
bipolarity to unipolarity after 1991, but great power war did not. This
suggests something else (e.g., nuclear deterrence or norms of warfare)
may be behind the absence of great power war both during and after
the Cold War. 14
For Martha Finnemore, the influence of unipolarity is limited by
the "social structure" (i.e., the norms) of international politics. Based
just on its privileged power, the unipole cannot necessarily get what
it wants: it might be constrained by the norms of the international
system that infuse institutions, dictate which actors and actions are
legitimate, and mediate whether actors are hypocritical. For Finnemore
the structure of power is not irrelevant, but power alone is too costly
to exercise. States (not just unipoles) must use the social structure of
the system to gain leverage over others. The argument makes sense,
but is much less about the nature of polarity (it would be true under
any distribution of power) than it is about how all actors use social
14

Joseph M. Grieco, "Structural Realism and the Problem of Polarity and War,"
in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds., Power in World Politics
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 64-82, in a critique of Waltz's use of polarity
concludes that "there do not appear to be solid scholarly grounds in support of
the view that polarity systematically influences the likelihood of war or other
forms of militarised conflicts" (68).
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norms to gain influence - and how all can be stymied by those norms
as well.
Stephen Walt explores how unipolarity affects alliance formation.
He brings to this task his famous formulation on threats: alliances will
depend on the threat the unipole presents and the reactions of others
to the dominant state. The question is, to what degree does threat
depend on unipolarity? For Walt the answer is ambiguous since threat
is driven not just by capabilities, but most importantly by offensive
capabilities and actor intentions. 15 We might presume that given the
US's overwhelming capabilities and its far-flung geographical reach
(witness two land wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, areas remote
from the United States) they would swamp the other determinants of
threat clearly marking the US as a danger against which other states
should balance.
But no, in this case, Walt finds that benign US intentions, not capabilities, are doing the lion's share of the work. Walt points to the
United States' liberal ideas and its historical legacy of global leadership since World War Two as key factors. The result is that there is
little overt "hard" balancing against the United States, though some
forms of discrete "soft" balancing are taking place that are intended to
hedge against possible malevolent US intentions. But overall, much of
alliance formation in current conditions is based on the United States
"not trying to conquer large swaths of the world." 16 Intentions, not
polarity, are the key.
Perhaps this is unique to unipolarity where a single dominant actor
is bound to be central to world politics. However in Walt's view the
same dynamic is clear in bipolarity: Europe sided with the United
States in the Cold War despite the US's more significant power and
armed occupation of Europe following World War Two. The Soviet
Union's intentions overwhelmed the US advantage in capabilities.17

15

16
17

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987).
Stephen M. Walt, Chapter 4, this volume, p. 132.
The Soviet Union's close geographic position also played a role, though the
United States occupied Western Europe at the end of World War Two. See
Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,"
International Security 9, 4 (1985), 34-37 and the discussion in Jeffrey W.
Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International
Security 24 (Fall 1999), 36-38.
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Uni-malevolence trumped bipolarity. Today uni-benevolence trumps
unipolarity. In both cases, polarity gets swamped.
Michael Mastanduno's study of the international economy and US
policy focuses on why the US will not get what it wants in the current unipolar system. It raises challenges for the notion of polarity in
a different way by arguing that capabilities are often issue specific.
"US dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena." 18 He
claims that the world was actually more unipolar in economic terms
during the Cold War than it has been since 1991. Today the sources
of US leverage - the strength of the US dollar as a global reserve
currency, the indispensability of the US market, and the dependence
of others on (and the credibility of) the US security guarantee (since
the Cold War ended) - is reduced. With waning relative economic
power and more dependence on other actors, the United States can be
expected to get less of what it wants and there will be more volatility in
the international economy. In essence, Mastanduno sees US economic
interdependence as more important than unipolarity.
Robert Jervis provides the most nuanced and perhaps elusive account
of unipolarity's impact on peace, stability, public goods provision, and
durability. His analysis shows most clearly there is not much to say
about unipolarity's effects without relying heavily on other factors.
There is very little that unipolarity or "structure" (by which he means
the distribution of capabilities) can explain on its own. For example
the claim that "security concerns are greatly reduced for the unipole
and for others it protects" 19 is dependent on the notion that the United
States is benign and that others are too. A unipolarity dominated by
Nazi Germany would be different. Similarly, if another power were
intent on war in the current unipolarity, the world would be very
dangerous. For now, none are. But great power intent is not necessarily
structural, and as seen below, may in fact determine structure.
Indeed from the structural capabilities perspective that Jervis uses
as a launching pad, what is really difficult to understand is why states
have not done more to secure themselves against America's power.
After all, in an anarchic world where states must rely on themselves
and there is no overarching authority to call for help, they should do
18
l9

Michael Mastanduno, Chapter 5, this volume, p. 142.
Jervis, Chapter 8, this volume, p. 258.
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anything possible to protect against the potential of an unpredictable
hegemon exercising its power wantonly. 20 But that has not happened.
And from a structural perspective, we should expect the unipole to
use its power for quite expansionist aims - what Jervis citing Waltz
and others refers to as "the characteristic error of unipolarity." 21 But
the United States has not done so - or at least it has done so modestly
given the nature of its advantages. To the extent it has expanded,
the reasons for doing so may be more closely connected to domestic
politics than polarity. Indeed Bloch-Elkan et al. make the case that any
US expansion is as much a result of partisan politics as the international
distribution of power. 22 Again polarity pales.
Unipolarity's lack of determinism or independent causal weight
requires an appeal to other factors to make sense of unipolarity's
effects. For example, besides the nature of the unipole and the intentions of others, Jervis invokes key aspects of "current circumstances"
such as the security community among leading states, nuclear weapons,
the widespread acceptance of liberal norms, and the danger of terrorism. Of these, nuclear weapons appear to dominate polarity. Jervis
ponders "what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated
world?" and seems to suggest not much. Here in a nutshell is the key
dilemma for unipolarity and polarity in general: once we control for
other factors, unipolarity's role seems marginal.
The strong flavor of the chapters is not about the impact of unipolarity, but instead what makes the impact of the current asymmetrical
distribution of power so limited. Factors such as status competition,
nuclear weapons, legitimacy, threat, economic interdependence, and
a variety of features unique to the current international environment
seem to overwhelm polarity. At a minimum, in each case, it is a conjunction of unipolarity and other factors that together have an impact.

Endogenous
The second issue for unipolarity is that far from being an objective
structure that shapes state choice, it appears to be the product of state
20
21
22

See Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Mearsheimer, Tragedy of
Great Power Politics.
See Jervis, Chapter 8, this volume, pp. 262-263.
Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Chapter 6, this
volume.
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choice. If this is so, the priority of systemic theorizing is in doubt and
the dangers of "reductionism" (i.e., explaining international politics
by relying on unit level traits) are diminished. 23 If polarity is a choice,
then there can be no systemic theorizing on the balance of power
without some reference to the determinants of state choice. Rather
than privileging structure in the study of world politics, this would
suggest the need for more attention to the thinking and actions of
great powers.
The notion that structure is caused by choice is apparent in several
chapters. For Walt it appears in the intentions of the unipole; for Jervis
it is values, and for Ikenberry it is organizational style. Such factors
are attributes or strategies; they are not products of the asymmetry
of material power. Of course, it may be that it is exactly because
of the structure - i.e., unipolarity - that the preferences, values, and
organizational style of the unipole do play such a huge role. Still such
an argument raises a major puzzle: why has the United States resisted
the main unipolar structural incentive that should supposedly guide it i.e., excessive expansion? 24
For example, since the end of the Cold War the United States has
not done a whole lot to reshape the dominant international institutions that structure global politics and largely failed when it has
tried to do so. There have of course been some regional pacts (e.g.,
NAFTA) and efforts based on old institutions (e.g., NATO enlargement, GATTIWTO). The George W. Bush administration did successfully create the Proliferation Security Initiative, but this modest venture
was a partial exception that proves the rule. This underambition and
underachievement, moreover, has come at a time when there seems
to be demand for change given that many international institutions
today appear outdated. 25 Scholars such as John Ikenberry, Stephen
Brooks, and William W ohlforth and policy makers like Douglas
Hurd (foreign secretary of Britain from 1989 to 1995) argue that
the United States after 1991 had an ideal opportunity to "remake
23
24
25

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 60-67.
Jervis, Chapter 8, this volume; Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the
Cold War," International Security 25 (Summer 2000), 13.
See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, "The Impending Demise of the Postwar
System," Survival 47, 4 (2005): 7-18; G. John Ikenberry, "A Weaker World,"
Prospect (November 2005): 30-33; Hanns Maull, "The Precarious State of
International Order," Asia-Pacific Review 13, 1 (2006): 68-77.
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the world, update everything, the UN, everything." 26 We are still
waiting.
The US inclination to use its power after the end of the Cold War
was fairly anemic. 27 It appeared that Richard Cheney as Secretary of
Defense attempted to get the government started in a more ambitious
direction in the defense planning guidance process that produced the
"Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy" in
1993 at the end of the George H. W. Bush administration. 28 But in
reality that was more an effort to fend off even greater defense budget
reductions than it was evidence of growing US global ambition. 29 The
Clinton administration struggled to find a grand strategy. And the
George W. Bush administration came into office forswearing global
military involvement, nation-building, and maintaining international
order. 30
Then came September 11, 2001 and things changed. Robert Jervis,
as usual, puts his finger directly on what happened and its theoretical importance: "Had terrorism not intervened, we might be talking
about decaying or potential unipolarity rather than real unipolarity, as
26

27

28

29

30

Hurd quote is from Mary E. Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold
War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4. See John
Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding
of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000);
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlfarth, "Reshaping the World Order:
How Washington Should Reform International Institutions," Foreign Affairs
88, 2 (March/April 2009): 49-63.
For a longer discussion of US policy see Jeffrey W. Legro, "The Mix That
Makes Uni polarity: Hegemonic Purpose and International Constraints,"
Review of International Affairs (forthcoming).
Patrick Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New
York Times, March 8, 1992. See too "Excerpts from the leaked Defense
Planning Guidance that The New York Times published on March 8, 1992,"
National Security Archive, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/
ebb245/doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf (accessed November 18, 2009).
It was mired in internal controversy and only issued at the last moment
without higher level presidential promotion. See Eric Edelman, "The Strange
Career of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance," in Melvyn P. Leffler and
Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., In Uncertain Times: American Strategy after the Berlin
Wall and 9111 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
See Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the
Post-Cold War World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008); Derek
Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars (New York: Public
Affairs, 1980).

Sell unipolarity?

353

awkward a distinction as this is from the standpoint of structure." 31
Or put differently, there was no actual unipolarity evident before 9/11
because the United States chose not to occupy that role. After 2001, the
"Bush Doctrine" was a more expansive strategy closer to that expected
from the structure of unipolarity. The Bush administration, however,
also consciously abandoned that strategy in its second term from 2005
to 2009. 32 Rather than strategy being a product of polarity, polarity
was a product of the choices of the United States.
This is not a phenomenon limited to the contemporary world. After
World War One the United States emerged as the most powerful country in world affairs. But rather than grow its military to increase its
dominance and embed its troops in the foreign lands it occupied in
1918, the United States cut its defense spending and called the troops
home. 33 Rather than seize leadership of the global economy and order,
US leaders refused to make commitments. 34 The United States, in effect
chose not to create a unipolar world after the war.
Immediately after World War Two the United States was in an even
stronger position of "potential" unipolarity as the world's only nuclear
power and producer of some 50 percent of the world's economic output (today it is closer to 25 percent). Yet it did not use that power to
overexpand. Instead it used that power to secure alliances and build
international institutions to protect and nurture an international order
compatible with its interests, as described in the chapter by John Ikenberry. That was a different choice than the non-entanglement following
World War One and it was also very different than the more expansionist policy we might expect from such a powerful country - one
even more dominant than after 1991.
In all these cases, after 1919, after 1945, and after 1991, what the
United States did varied more significantly with the way it thought
about the world and the strategies it preferred than any incentive
31

32
33

34

Jervis, Chapter 8, this volume, p. 270.
Philip H. Gordon, "The End of the Bush Revolution," Foreign Affairs 85, 4
(July/August 2006): 75-86.
David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1973 ); Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World:
Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005).
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or constraint of its asymmetrical power. Since those choices are not
explained by the structure of international power, we require an exogenous theory of America's thinking and preferences.
The polarity of the system depends not only on the unipole, but also
on the choices of lesser powers as well. They after all can also decide to
deploy their resources in ways that can alter the basic system structure
that is so often treated as the source of choices. Consider, for example,
Randall Schweller's analysis of tripolarity in the interwar period. He
contends that a key cause of the changes in national strategies in the
1930s was a shift in polarity in the international system from "multi"
to "tripolarity" (with the United States, Russia, and Germany as the
poles). This change might be seen as simply a product of the grinding gears of the constantly changing world political economy. This,
however, was not the case for Nazi Germany. Instead tripolarity was
largely the product of a purposeful and intense military buildup by
one actor - Germany. 35 Polarity alone did not breed the aggression
that started World War Two. Aggressive intentions were the more
proximate cause - specifically, a culmination of German resentments
from the World War One settlement. National choice caused systemic
polarity; the rat conditioned the box, the dog controlled its silent
fence.
Polarity today similarly depends on the thinking of at least two other
actors: China and the European Union. Widely seen as a future pole,
China could reach that status much quicker than expected by analyses
that predict a lag of two-to-four decades, if it chose to do so. Its GNP
is rapidly rising and even if its per capita income will not equal that
of the United States for some time, its aggregate wealth is mounting
rapidly. Today China is sitting on a mound of cash- over $2 trillion that if it were converted into military power could make it a much
more significant challenger - at least in Asia. Kenneth Waltz suggested
in 1993 that the international system was not unipolar despite the
collapse of the USSR because Russia still had a secure second strike
arsenal. 36 By these standards at least, China could arguably choose to

35

36

Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of
World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), esp. 26-29,
93-120.
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics,"
International Security 18, 2 (1993): 44-79.
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be a pole today by focusing on a rapid nuclear buildup and the strengthening of its sea power in the littoral waters of the Pacific and South
Pacific. 37
Similarly, if the European Union could establish its authority over
its members and begin to plan like a unitary state, it too could become
a peer competitor for the United States in a relatively short time. 38
While both outcomes are unlikely, they do indicate that the polarity
of the system is made not just by the existing poles. Other countries,
those that are potential poles, can also mold polarity by their choices.
To posit that analysts should start with structure defined as polarity
to explain state choices and international outcomes when state choices
present a clear and powerful cause of polarity is of course deeply
problematic. At a minimum, this endogeneity requires some account
of the national policies that are in many cases the beginning of the
causal chain. If states make choices about polarity anticipating the
structures those choices will cause, it would be misguided to place too
much causal autonomy on structure (i.e., polarity) itself.

Incomplete
A final problem in the study of unipolarity is a conception of structure
limited to capabilities. This, however, ignores the ideas (i.e., norms,
rules, and principles) that provide the rules of different international
systems over time. The nature of international order - its durability,
the level of conflict, the degree of interdependence - may indeed be
affected by the distribution of capabilities. But they also depend on
the norms and rules of any particular order - that can vary even as a
particular type of polarity is the same. This suggests that we need to
understand not only capabilities, but what John Ruggie called systemic
"content. " 39
Martha Finnemore addresses this dimension directly by emphasizing "social structure" - i.e., the norms that dominate the international
37
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systems such as "sovereignty, liberalism, self-determination, and border rigidity." 40 Wohlfarth notes that unipolar systems can differ
according to different cultural understandings that affect status competition and conflict. As we have seen, some of these depend on the
unipole, but as Robert Jervis points out, "whether others will comply also depends on nonstructural factors, especially the coincidence
or discrepancy between the worlds they prefer and the one sought by
the superpower." 41 As Finnemore writes, "power alone tells us little
about the kind of politics states will construct for themselves. " 42 But
what does tel1 us the kind of politics and social structures states will
construct for themselves?
Dominant powers appear to spend much time and effort attempting to provide the principles - if not the primary model for national
development - in the international system. Michael Mastanduno
recounts how the United States since World War Two has been intent
on maintaining the liberal economic design of the system in the face
of challenges from alternative models from developing economies in
the "New International Economic Order" or from the state-directed
development of Japan (or China today). 43 The Cold War was fueled
as much by a competition to define the content of world politics as it
was an exercise in insecurity based on comparable capabilities under
bipolarity.
Great powers want to control the values and norms that characterize
the international system because it makes exercising influence cheaper.
If others are on board with the basic principles, then the unipole does
not need to use as much muscle (or grease as many palms) to get
its desired outcome. 44 When there are no feasible alternatives to the
dominant set of norms and models, we can expect more integration
and cooperation. 45 Indeed we might expect a strong and dominant set
of systemic values to be a source of stability even as power varies.
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This is in part what Ikenberry predicts in his chapter arguing that
the US has become the "Grand Central Station" of the international
system not just because of its power, but because its rule-based, open,
and inclusive order breeds vested interests, economies of scale, and
opportunities to thrive that raise barriers and reduce incentives to
overthrow it. Coupled with a lower potential for great power war
(thanks to nuclear deterrence and democratic peace), the US unipolar
order could live on even as the US's relative power dissipates.
Yet to suggest that the content of the international system (not just
polarity) matters still begs the question of where content comes from
and when it is likely to remain stable or change. The strong claim
would be that the content of the system depends simply on the unipole
and its power-molded preferences. But no one in these chapters makes
that case. The puzzle of system content again points to the need for a
more complex view of the causal role of polarity.

Conjunctural causation
These three problems - the ambiguity, endogeneity, and incompleteness of unipolarity- are issues that trouble not only our understanding
of the current international system, but polarity in general. Together
they question the significant role polarity (and a view of international
structure based on capabilities) has played in international relations
theory since Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics. If unipolarity is dwarfed by other causes in relative causal weight, if it is
endogenous to actor choice, and if systemic structure itself is defined
by ideas versus capabilities, then polarity's privileged place as a cause
of world politics is diminished. The common wisdom that Jervis puts
succinctly- "we should still start our analysis with structure" - hardly
seems compelling. 46
This "primacy of polarity" view risks skewing our understanding
of international politics by encouraging a positive finding of polarity
influence and discouraging further investigation of other arguments
that may provide superior explanations. Why continue to examine situations where polarity gives a seemingly coherent answer? 47 Similarly,
46
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the presumption of an "additive" research practice that asks us to start
with polarity and then move on to other factors is that the world is
one where causes are independent and their effects can be summed. If
the world, however, is one where certain factors are only influential
in interaction with other factors, then an additive model would be
misspecified and lead to faulty results. 48
These issues strongly suggest that we need to look beyond standard
polarity analysis by pursuing conjunctural analysis - where two or
more factors interact in regular and conjoint ways to produce results. 49
As a collective project that focuses on unipolarity's effects, this book
clearly risks ignoring the conjunction of causes. Individual chapters,
however, are rich in considering, or suggesting the possibilities for,
conjunctural causation. Wohlfarth explores the intersection of polarity and the status-seeking genetic nature of humans; Finnemore, polarity and international social structure; Walt, polarity and intentions;
Mastanduno, polarity and rise and decline; Jervis, polarity and "current circumstances"; Ikenberry, polarity and unipole order strategy;
and Snyder et al., polarity and domestic politics. 50 These chapters
identify, but mostly do not probe, the dynamics of these conjunctural
causes - i.e., how they lead to continuity and change in effects, and
how exactly their interactive (not additive "unipolarity plus y") logic
produces impact.
To say that polarity has received too much prominence in the study
of international relations is not to say it is irrelevant. Instead, it is to
suggest that polarity's impact is not as a causal variable that dominates international structure, but instead that it is a factor that works
synthetically with other causes to shape outcomes. In what follows, a
sketch of one particular conjuncture - i.e., between power and ideas is explored.
48
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The interaction of polarity and ideas
If the polarity of the system deserves less of an emphasis in the study of
international politics, then the question is, what deserves more? One
candidate is found in the ideas that motivate national strategies and
that characterize international order. 51 The point is not that polarity
has no impact and ideas are the main cause. Instead it is about how
pragmatic rational actors (state officials and states themselves) are
shaped both by power and dominant social ideas in making the politics
that produce national strategies and systemic rules.
States and international orders require dominant ideas and rules to
facilitate cooperation, coordination, and collective action. Actors at
both levels compete to control the ideas that guide collective thinking.
If these ideas were simply a product of who had power at any particular
time, or what a particular individual actor thought, they would change
when power changed or when new actors replaced old actors - and
they would be meaningless. Yet US ideas about international commitments did not change when the United States became the top dog after
World War One. German ideas about foreign policy became much
more aggressive in the early 1930s even though Germany's potential
relative power had not changed dramatically.
Collective ideas are resistant to change both within national and
international societies because such notions are often inspired by
past events that are tattooed on individual and societal memories,
entrenched in practices and institutions, backed by partisans who benefit from them, and subject to collective action hurdles that deter change
efforts. Typically it is difficult for individual actors to know if others
desire change, and if they do, how much they will risk in acting on
their preferences. Lacking such information, they cannot be sure that
their own desire and efforts for change will have any effect. They must
mount a case for why the old ideas are defunct, which can involve considerable effort; and because doing so threatens tradition, they invite
51
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social and political sanction. This is typically the source of findings
that "history" or path dependence matter.
These societal ideas are however sometimes subject to change
according to a "does it work?" pragmatic logic. When events do not
meet the expectations of existing ideas and the results are undesirable,
critics of existing ideas have opportunities to convince others to take
action to challenge them. To realize change, critics must also agree
on a new orthodoxy and its effectiveness. Reform efforts can founder
on an absence of alternatives or too many alternatives or a perceived
failure of new thinking.
Polarity and power clearly play a role in this synthesis. Relative
power can negate or sustain the expectations generated by a state's
dominant ideas of appropriate action. Hitler was able to gain momentum and political support within Germany in part because his rapid
buildup caught other countries unawares producing early victories
that gave plausibility to his radical plans and weakened his domestic
critics. 52 Relative power can make a particular type of international
structure (one that combines polarity and rules) endure or collapse.
Wohlfarth explains that Gorbachev's attempt to enshrine new thinking/mutual security as the dominant global model failed because the
Soviet Union had no booty to back it. 53
This view of state intentions and international structure is explicitly
conjunctural. It features the way that ideas and power work together
to shape incentives for actors and outcomes. Ideas define expectations
which provide guidelines to assess outcomes. But the goalposts for
action depend on preexisting ideas. The need for this type of conjunctural analysis is clear in looking at sources of the two key foundations
of unipolar international politics: national strategies and international
structure.

Polar intentions
The nature of great power intentions shapes international structure in
terms of both capabilities and content. Great powers can sometimes
choose to become poles - or not. If state purpose were simply a product
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of the distribution of power, there would be no need to discuss what
shapes purpose. But that is not the case.
The history of US foreign policy reflects the fact that US thinking about managing the international arena does not march in lockstep with its polarity. To be sure, increasing power can influence
ambition. 54 Yet throughout history, even as its relative power was
growing, the United States has been amazingly reticent to change its
thinking about the international arena and it has usually not attempted
to rewrite international rules. Indeed, it appears that the US approach
to major power politics only changed significantly during World War
Two. In those years, the United States discarded its longstanding desire
to separate itself from the political-military entanglements of the international system and instead choose to integrate itself. The "Bush revolution" represented a potential second effort, but it was abandoned
relatively quickly.
A conjunctural approach involving ideas and power is one way to
explain this variation. Political leaders adopt broad ideas (strategies)
to explain national action and justify their own choices, thus setting a
baseline of social expectations of what should result. Domestic political
supporters and opponents then use those baselines to assess - and
support or critique - existing policies depending on events. Power
shapes the ability of different policies to generate results. Ideas without
power are ineffective. Power without ideas does not motivate and/or
coordinate supporters and critics.
When events match the expectations leaders generate with desirable
results there is little pressure for change - even if polarity indicates
change is likely. For example, the end of the Cold War did not contradict the expectations of the existing US approach or bring unwanted
results. The United States had adhered strictly to its postwar position
of active commitments to international order and containment. And
the outcome from that behavior - the end of the Cold War on US
terms - was widely seen as a success. With no challenge to the US
orthodoxy and no negative results for critics and reformers to use to
54
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rally fence sitters, it was difficult to reorient US strategy for the new
era away from the old tried and true Cold War formula. Inertia and
the defenders of tradition easily deflected a variety of task forces and
commissions pushing for change in the United States in the 1990s.
The dynamics of the conjunctural approach help to account for
both the effort at change following 9/11 and its failure. In contrast
to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 attacks did contradict
expectations that Cold War thinking could continue to provide for US
security. 55 Moreover, the ground had been prepared for a replacement
strategy. A dedicated and energetic set of social activists - commonly
referred to as "neoconservatives" - had developed and promulgated a
coherent world view in the 1990s. 56 These thinkers held influence and
positions in the government in the Bush administration. Thus when
the 9/11 attack unsettled the commitment to the old ideas, they had
an approach ready to go that could replace it.
The problem was that effort achieved some successes but, mired
in Iraq, resented by international opinion, and largely perceived as
ineffective, it lost significant support. In the 2008 presidential election,
both the Democratic and Republican candidates promised a retreat
from the Bush agenda, and a return to the prior consensus. 57 Indeed
the Bush administration itself, in 2005 and after, had already largely
returned to a position that was more akin to its Cold War predecessors
than the new doctrine initiated after 9/11. 58
In sum, whether US ambition and its approach to international order
changes or not, depends not just on its power, but on preexisting ideas,
alternative concepts, the expectations they generate, and events. Polarity still matters - for example, superior capabilities allowed the United
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States leverage in shaping the content and competence of international
order. But the limited power of even the hegemon to ensure success
in a world of many challenges was evident in the reversal of the Bush
revolution.

The content of polarity
Just as individuals compete to establish the dominant ideas that guide
nations, so too do states contest the content of international structure
(Finnemore's "social structure"). The logic of what shapes that contest
bears resemblance to the pragmatic politics that shape the strategies
of states. Orders evolve based on power and perceived effectiveness.
Principles and models gain dominance because they fulfill the expectations they offer with desirable results. Events that challenge those rules
provide room for potential change in content.
International order is not simply the product of the strongest others must be accommodated and won over as well. 59 A range of
scholarship suggests there must be common interests or shared purpose
between the hegemon and other important countries, or they must be
persuaded/coerced into joining ranks to form some sort of international
order.
This argument takes at least three different forms. The first comes
from John Ruggie who argues that order requires congruence of social
purpose among states. Power and purpose do not always move in
the same direction. For example, the economic program of Holland's
rivals in the seventeenth century did not match its own mercantilism.
Furthermore there must be a fit between domestic social purpose and
that of international regimes. Thus the interwar free market structure
of global capitalism was not acceptable to states that turned to a
government management modeI. 60
Robert Gilpin points to the need for common interests for a "potential" hegemony to translate into "actual" order. The hegemon can
"seldom coerce reluctant states to obey the rules ... and must seek
their co-operation. These other states co-operate with the hegemon
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because it is their own economic and security interests to do so." 61
Thus the United States played the lead role in organizing the international system after World War Two, but it did so with the strong
support of the allies - and to the extent order existed internationally,
in tacit collaboration with the Soviet Union.
The third approach to hegemony comes from the Gramscian tradition that sees hegemony as mainly a project of domination where
consensus trumps coercion. In this view hegemony is initially established as a result of a deal (historic bloc) that is cut between the strong
and the weak (classes, states, etc.). This deal over time assumes a
taken-for-granted stat~s that facilitates order. 62
In short, power alone is not enough to establish order; it also depends
on the ideas/intentions/preferences and policies of other states in the
international system. The ability to cut deals depends on accommodating these and persuading others that one has a workable set of policies
and principles.
The fact that order - even in hegemonic unipolar situations demands the cooperation and deal making of the dominant powers
sets up the dynamics of pragmatic politics at the system level as well.
States compete to demonstrate the efficacy of their models as the
paradigms for structuring international order. At times particular
models/states are able to gain hegemonic roles to which others adapt.
The international society school has explicated the way that Europe's
rules spread and became the basis for today's global rules. 63 The Cold
War saw the United States undertake an extensive effort to spread its
own values in the international system as John Ikenberry charts above.
And at least since the end of the Cold War (and for a good bit before
that) the United States has continued to attempt to define order albeit not in equal measure to its power. These US efforts have
of course generated pushback at times - illustrating that there are
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other constraints in the international system besides the distribution of
power. 64
At the international level, events that contradict the expectations
generated by dominant actors and their ideas will nurture opportunities
for critics of the dominant ideas to attempt to alter the content of
structure. 65
Certainly opponents of the US-supported principles of the inter~
national system - e.g., human rights, rule of law, liberal economic
policies, etc. - have used US deviations from those principles as a
tool to undermine American authority and the system itself. Martha
Finnemore nicely shows how legitimacy and hypocrisy are used to
constrain the United States when it violates existing rules and its own
self-proclaimed principles.
Claims of efficacy matter as well. For example, the meltdown of
the global economy in 2008-2009 produced many critiques of the
US-led system. There were arguments made from different quarters
that different national economic systems might provide better models
(e.g., state directed capitalism) or international economic rules (i.e.,
more heavily regulated as in the EU). The stabilization of the global
economy and the United States has for the time being stalled such
critiques. But the dynamic is familiar -from Western models replacing
local ones in Japan and other countries in Asia in the late nineteenth
century, to the challenge fascist states made vis-a-vis democracies in the
1930s. States that produce desirable results and fulfill the expectations
they generate will be in a good position to act as models for the content
of international structure.
As Wohlfarth points out, in this battle over whose rules will define
the content of international structure, "the ability to persuade is linked
to material capability. " 66 Yet it is also true that capabilities and claims
and competence are assessed vis-a-vis particular ideas. Hence international structure is defined by ideas as well as power. And whether
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structure endures or changes depends on the interaction of capabilities
and ideas that allow the dominant power(s) to retain legitimacy or
those who oppose it (them) to gain momentum.

Polarity is dead, long live unipolarity
If the above is right, perhaps the primacy of polarity in international
relations theory has passed from the scene. Because of its ambiguous
impact as an autonomous cause, because it appears to be as much a
product of state choice as an arbiter of state choice, and because it
incompletely characterizes the nature of international structure, polarity should be stripped of its advantaged causal position. That is what
these chapters collectively suggest.
Yet polarity as a "normal variable" - along with others such as institutions, political structure, ideology, interdependence, etc. - endures.
Polarity matters and deserves attention. Most important for understanding the future of world politics, we need to explain better how
polarity works in conjunction with other factors to shape outcomes
involving both the intentions of states and the content of international
structure. The chapters in this book point to rich possibilities. What
is needed is work to illuminate how the interaction of these different
variables produces particular policies and structures. A causal portfolio dominated by polarity is a path to impoverished understanding;
polarity in the mix with other factors promises dependable returns.
There are good reasons to believe that unipolarity as a description of
world politics may be with us for a while. This is true both because the
United States has a significant advantage in material capabilities that
may wane but will not disappear in the next two decades and because
other prominent countries have not yet displayed ambitious intentions
that suggest they will make a run at polar status. 67 The answers to
how much longer that situation can continue and with what impact
will likely depend on the conjunction of power and ideas.
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